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ABSTRACT. This exploratory paper coins the term “academic pathologies” to 
discuss in a critical approach the culture of the academic self focusing on what is 
called “anxieties of knowledge”. The paper plays with these themes in reference to 
the work of Kierkegaard, the American film director Woody Allen, and Jacques 
Derrida. This topic and paper has eluded me over the years as I tried to gapple with 
various formulations. The paper that follows the history of my failed attempts is an 
exercise in self-therapy, confession and self-examination about my continuing in- 
ability to produce this paper. 
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Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look 
down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for 
this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he 
had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which 
emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks 
down into its own possiblity, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. 
Freedom succumbs in this dizziness 
—Søren Kierkegaard (1968) The Concept of Anxiety, p. 152 
 
Who has the more difficult task: the teacher who lectures on earnest 
things a meteor’s distance from everyday life-or the learner who should 
put it to use? 
—Søren Kierkegaard (1962) Works of Love. p. 62 
 
I have been trying to write one particular academic paper now for many 
years, at least over a decade and I can’t cut the mustard so to speak. This 
paper has gone by different names that have stabilized around the words 
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“academic pathologies”. Sometimes I have tried unsuccessfully to write this 
paper with different co-authors including my wife and partner Tina Besley 
who has a therapy background as a counselor in one of her past lives: I am 
one of her “works in progress”. Other times I have tried to work on the 
paper with other colleagues. The paper has never got much beyond an idea 
or a few scribbled notes. Actually I lie: I counted recently when coming to 
write this paper seven different beginnings some of a few lines, others, an 
abstract, a table of contents, and an introduction sketching out the contours 
of the concept. I will share these failed attempts a little later. I should say 
this failure to write is a very unusual situation for me because I write easily 
and freely. It has not always been the case. I should explain that by most 
standards I do write quite a lot. I have written over 60 books and some 500 
papers and chapters. I also do a lot of editing. At last count I edit over 32 
issues of journals per year. And last year I established a new journal called 
Knowledge Cultures with Addleton Academic Publishers. 
This paper, then, is an exercise in self-therapy, confession and self-
examination about my continuing inability to produce this paper. It is also a 
public exorcism. I am hoping that I can finally rid myself of this ghost 
paper, an insistent idea that forever returns to my academic consciousness 
and says: “write this paper it is probably the most important piece you will 
ever write!”; “make this idea!” “Create!” Only by finally writing it will I be 
able to stop thinking about it. There is a certain anxiety with not being able 
to produce. For me there is also as well the sheer luxury of being able to 
endlessly dwell in a state of indecision and contemplation, a state of anxiety 
before knowledge, before choosing how and with what words one will put 
a stamp on a series of difficult concepts and aspects of experience that 
swim in the imagination but refuse the various forms I try to assign them: I 
call this the “anxieties of knowing”.  
I believe that I coined this phrase linking it to a range of different 
academic pathologies. “Anxieties of knowing” include anxieties about read- 
ing, writing, speaking, thinking and learning. By anxiety I mean the com- 
monly accepted definition that emphasizes “uneasiness” or “apprehension” 
or “uncertainty” and sometimes “fear” of an anticipated state, event or 
situation that may cause psychological impairment or feelings of insecurity 
and helplessness. The notion of anxiety here could easily be called by a 
variety of other kinship terms: “dread”, “angst”, even “despair” or less 
dramatically, “annoyance”, ‘irritation”, “disturbance”. It’s a universal sen- 
timent or feeling that is often associated in the philosophical literature with 
“doubt” or “skepticism” and sometimes with forms of “madness” that we 
might say take the form of pronounced, exaggerated, deep anxiety that can 
lead to desperation, despair, anguish and depression.   
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This is the “dark epistemology” of not-knowing, the neuroanatomy of 
the visceral mind, the confusion of unruly, inchoate and formless thought 
that troubles us and calls for resolution and order, if only temporarily. The 
word “knowing” is used here with imprecision: some people will say why 
not “writing” or “thinking”? I am happy to contemplate these substitute 
notions but I also employ the poet’s license to invent the metaphors. “Anx- 
ieties of knowing”, “academic pathologies”: Anxiety, Dread, Angst. Despair. 
This run of concepts reminds me of the great Danish philosopher Søren 
Kierkegaard, widely considered one of the foundational thinkers of existen- 
tialism, who wrote and published Fear and Trembling (1843), The Concept 
of Anxiety (1844) and some twenty-one major works in a period of nine years 
between 1841–1850 often under pseudonoms on topics concerning Chris- 
tianity, theology and the philosophy of religion, ethics, and psychology.  
His highly personal and poetic work focusing on “truth as subjectivity” 
engages with how one lives an ethical life as an individual with freedom, 
choice, commitment and faith. He wrote The Concept of Anxiety in 1844 as 
a psychological deliberation on the dogmatic issue of hereditary sin. In this 
work he examines the experience of anxiety through the example of a man 
standing on the edge of a cliff who both fears falling into the abyss and also 
feels the terrifying impulse to throw himself over the cliff.  
The experience of anxiety or dread is a fact of our complete freedom to 
do something that includes the most terrifying possibilities and triggers our 
feelings of dread. In Kierkegaard’s theological discussion “anxiety” precedes 
“sin”. Hence, for Kierkegaard “anxiety is the dizziness of freedom”. As he 
says in in one of his journals “Anxiety is the first reflex of possibility, a 
look yet a terrible spell” (JP, vol 1, 102: Pap. X2 A22). Arne Gron (2008) 
is a researcher affiliated with the Center for Subjectivity Research at the 
University of Copenhagen and an expert theologian on Kierkegaard explains: 
“The concept of anxiety leads us directly to freedom, but what freedom 
means is encircled negatively by examining forms of unfreedom. In anxiety 
the possibility of freedom presents itself, but in anxiety a human being also 
becomes unfree” (p. ix). For Kierkegaard as Gron reminds us, anxiety opens 
up the question of what it means to be a human being. 
I use the term “anxieties of knowing” to suggest the “burden of freedom” 
that one faces in choosing words to formulate a sentence, or a research 
topic, or an interpretation of a work, or indeed an utterance. On any topic 
seemingly there is a vast literature, a myriad of choices of word and phrases. 
The past is strewn with many literatures: so many great thinkers, poets, 
writers have gone before us. The prospect of saying something – anything 
of significance – is so daunting and many students and faculty in face of 
adding to knowledge say to themselves: what do I have to say? Do I have 
anything to say? Who am I in the history of ideas to add anything of con- 
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sequence? Conscious of the past couple of thousand years of tradition of 
literacy these anxious individuals are reduced to silence and to the anguish 
of thinking they have nothing to contribute.  
The phrase “anxieties of knowing” also reminds me of the greatest living 
Jewish New York philosopher, film director Woody Allen. The gravity of 
his philosophy is explored in a series of movies, scripts, roles, plays and 
books that exemplify the American tradition of stand-up and slap-stick 
comedy coloured with European art cinema and particularly Bergman and 
Fellini. He starts his “Speech to the Graduates” (1979) with the following 
remark: 
 
More than at any other time in history, mankind faces a cross- 
roads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The 
other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to 
choose correctly. 
 
I speak, by the way, not with any sense of futility, but with a 
panicky conviction of the absolute meaninglessness of existence 
which could easily be misinterpreted as pessimism. 
 
It is not. It is merely a healthy concern for the predicament of 
modern man. (Modern man is here defined as any person born 
after Nietzsche’s edict that ‘God is dead,’ but before the hit 
recording ‘I Wanna Hold Your Hand.’) This ‘predicament’ can 
be stated one of two ways, though certain linguistic philosophers 
prefer to reduce it to a mathematical equation where it can be 
easily solved and even carried around in the wallet. 
 
Woody Allen’s instincts are not untutored yet in contrast to Kierkegaard he 
uses comedy rather than tragedy to explore the fundamental existential con- 
dition of humanity. Adam Cohen (2007) writing for the New York Times 
suggests: “More than any other American writer, Mr. Allen put existential 
dread on the map.” He reviews Allen’s two collections of his comedic 
essays: The Insanity Defense: The Complete Prose and Mere Anarchy and 
goes on to write: 
 
When Mr. Allen started out doing stand-up comedy in Greenwich 
Village clubs, young people sat in cafes reading books like Sartre’s 
Being and Nothingness, and debated man’s fate late into the 
night. Mr. Allen found himself turning to the same questions. 
‘What if everything is an illusion and nothing exists?’ he won- 
dered. “In that case, I definitely overpaid for my carpet.” 
 
Existence is considered as an absurd cosmic joke. As Allen once said about 
all the characters in his films: “You’re born and you don’t know the script, 
you suffer tragedy and catastrophe, and then you are wiped out for no 
offence that you have committed”. Allen explores the desire of many of his 
characters to ground their lives in traditional ethical values despite their 
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realization that such values may no longer be certain and the idea that con- 
temporary American society is rapidly descending into barbarism precisely 
because of societal failure to maintain a sense of individual moral respon- 
sibility. 
 
Woody Allen on Existentialism 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RB9afLhro3M   
 
 
I am often asked why I write so much. I guess as much as experiencing 
problems with academic writing, “writing too much” can be seen as com- 
pulsive behaviour, as an academic pathology in itself. One colleague told me 
facetiously and semi-seriously some years ago that my new performance 
target for next year was to write half of what I wrote last year and the 
following year to write half again. He is a colleague for whom writing is a 
form of self-torture causing him deep and continuing distress, sleepless 
nights, and hours of sitting at a computer mulling over the same sentence 
for hours. His feelings of distress are exacerbated by the fact that his father, 
a famous professor of Islamic history, wrote over sixty single-authored books 
in his life-time. He can spend a week writing a paper and end up with 
nothing but a whole raft of feelings of self-disgust and emptiness. It is self-
imposed distress, a form of self-hurt and personal self-inflicted behavior 
often causing deep psychological suffering. He and many others – both 
students and colleagues – have a deep anxiety and fear of writing.   
Psychologists talk of reading and writing problems in terms of “dyslexia” 
and “dysgraphia”. These are technical terms defined in a neurological dis- 
course with very specific meanings: 
 
Dyslexia has been defined as, ‘a disorder in children who, despite 
conventional classroom experience, fail to attain the language 
skills of reading, writing and spelling, commensurate with their 
intellectual abilities.’ – World Federation of Neurology. 
‘A complex neurological condition, which is constitutional in 
origin. The symptoms may affect various areas of learning and 
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function and may be described as a specific difficulty in read- 
ing, spelling and written language. One or more of these areas 
may be affected: numeracy, notational skills (music), motor 
function and organisational skills. However, it is particularly 
related to mastering written language, although oral language may 
be affected to some degree.’ – British Dyslexia Association 
Dysgraphia sometimes termed agraphia is a specific deficiency 
in the ability to write not associated with ability to read, or due 
to intellectual impairment. (See for example, the Institute for 
Neuro-Physiological Psychology website at http://www.inpp. 
org.uk/).  
 
Yet I am not talking about the fear of writing as a neurological problem but 
rather as a philosophical and educational problem that is connected with a 
range of other problems of self, fundamentally of self-expression, of the 
culture of the academic self, often exacerbated by “performance anxiety” in 
a publish or perish environment. But the fear of writing is not simply a fear 
experienced by scholars and students who experience problems with writing 
but also by those for whom writing is everything. Let me elaborate by 
viewing a clip of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida talking about the 
fear of writing. 
 
Jacques Derrida - Fear of Writing 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoKnzsiR6Ss 
 
 
The comments posted on this YouTube clip are interesting. Somebody writes 
(grammar and writing in the original): 
 
“Holy shit this is exactly how i felt writing my term paper.”  
 
Another adds: 
“Monsieur Derrida, the charlatan.” 
 
In the same vein, someone adds: 
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“Such agony, living as he does, as the divine instrument of great cosmic 
philosophical forces: the danger, the sense of mission, the posturing and 
hairstyling… The vanity is overwhelming.” 
 
One person, closer to where I’m standing, writes: 
 
“It’s all about nudity. Writing (good writing) rips your clothes off. It’s an 
expression. Your soul has spoken, and perhaps somebody has listened. Tak- 
ing your (actual) clothes off, letting the dreams and thoughts overwhelm 
you – how could you possibly avoid anxiety?” 
 
I have so far focused on the fear of writing, certainly a pathology and one 
that haunts writers and philosophers and academics, perhaps also journalists, 
speech-writers and people in their everyday lives whenever they have to 
write, speak or think before an audience. We hear of “writer’s block”. This 
is how one critic portrays the contemporary Singaporean playwright Tan 
Tarn How’s play Fear of Writing: 
 
Fear of Writing portrays a playwright’s creative handicap – the 
writer’s block – under intense anxiety and scrutiny. Through this 
crisis, Tan uncovers the existentialism of self-censorship and 
freedoms in Singapore. An urgent provocation of the country’s 
boundaries – as bound to art, artist, citizen and humanity. 
 
There are many remedies and programmes: “Ten Steps to Overcome Your 
Fear of Writing”. I don’t have the time to explore or even discuss these 
“writing technologies of the self” tonight. All I want to say is that fear of 
writing is very definitely an educational and a philosophical problem. Phil- 
osophically speaking we can consider it an “academic pathology” that is 
connected to deeper problems of the academic self and to the question of 
style and to problems of self-stylization or self-creation. We might say 
simply “writing the self” to use an expression used by the late Michel 
Foucault. By “self-stylization” I do not mean “dummy subjects”, “split 
verbs”, “verbosity”, “Prepositions at the End of a Clause Beginning With 
That”, “Dangling Modifiers”, or other defective rule of the style manual. 
Both terms – “academic pathology” and “writing the self” – I have used 
consistently in my thinking and in my work over the years. I borrowed the 
term from Foucault who used it to describe an ancient form of self-writing  
(hupomnemata) used by the Greeks, a kind of journal or notebook to cap- 
ture the already said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and 
for a purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self” (Foucault, 
1997: p. 211). It is an ancient art for “care of the self”. The concept of 
“writing the self”, like reading or speaking the self is part of attaining 
selfhood in the world of literacy and especially in academic culture. Texts, 
especially those in the humanities, are autoethnographies in this sense and 
we have genres that consist entirely of the expression of self: diaries, letters, 
 62 
confessions, autobiographies. Some scholars argue that the modern novel 
arises as a narrative expression of character. Is all writing both autobio- 
graphical and therapeutic? I have used the term “writing the self” in relation 
to the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s confessional style of 
philosophizing that is compelled to tell the truth and thus creates conditions 
for ethical self-formation (Peters, 2002). 
Foucault’s colleague at the College de France, Pierre Hadot, signals to 
us the importance of writing the self as the basis for understanding the 
development of academic cultures. In his investigations of “spiritual exer- 
cises” in Latin antiquity Hadot (1995: 81) describes in the philosophy of 
the Stoics the way in which “thought, as it were, takes itself as its own 
subject-matter” as the basis for an art of living where the individual is trans- 
formed into an authentic state of heightened self-consciousness providing 
both inner peace and freedom. 
Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, a seminal work written 
in 1929, explores the fundamental tension between the individual’s quest 
for freedom and civilization’s demand for conformity. It is a work where 
he contemplates for the first time the notion and consequences of a “sick” 
culture. Where the early Freud was interested in specific neurotics, in 
Civilization and its Discontents Freud expands his interest to identifying 
the neurotic aspects of society itself. I acknowledge him in this regard not 
because I believe in “oceanic feelings”, the Oedipal conflict, or theories of 
sexual drives but because he provides the insight that we might contem- 
plate the frustrations to individual freedom of self-expression as a primary 
source of academic pathology. I use the term pathology, then, in its original 
Greek sense of pathos to refer “feelings” or “sufferings” and “-logy” as the 
study of these sufferings. Academic pathologies are the study of the causes, 
development, changes, and consequences of changes of subjects who suffer 
from impediments to their fundamental self-expression, sometimes cause 
or brought about by the academic culture itself. 
I thought I had invented the term “academic pathology” when I first 
started thinking about this topic many years ago. Now I discover to my 
horror that an online journal in education took up the term as the theme for 
a special issue in 2009. In Educational Insights, the Editors of the journal 
write: 
 
In 2007 sociology professor, Doug Aoki, (University of Alberta) 
assembled a call for an issue of Educational Insights exploring 
the paradoxical relationship between pathology and normalcy in 
the context of teaching, research, labour, theory and writing 
within the Academy, ‘in love and hatred, pride and prejudice, 
genius and folly, sex and lies.’ 
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They continue: 
 
The academy systematizes pathology through a myriad of vec- 
tors. Once again, the diagnosis turns on how we handle the 
language. Patho-, from pathos, means suffering or feeling; -logy, 
that definitive academic suffix, is the venerable normalization 
of logos, with all its familiarly appalling connotations. Then a 
productive reading of academic pathologies is the variable in- 
stitutional logics of suffering and feeling in the university. 
 
The articles themselves follow with some interesting titles: 
“Desentence(sizing) the Reference: Lifenotes in Endnotes” 
Hartley Banack and Daniela Elza, Simon Fraser University 
“Living in Paradox” 
Ardra Cole, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto 
“The Academy of Everyday Life – Psychology, Hauntology, and Psychoanalysis” 
Jan de Vos, Ghent University 
“Enlivening the Curriculum of Health-Related Fitness” 
Rebecca J. Lloyd, University of Ottawa 
Stephen J. Smith, Simon Fraser University 
“I Shouldn’t Be Telling You This – A Story of Teacher Burnout and Attrition” 
Nan Nassef, University of British Columbia 
“Geo-literacies in a Strange Land: Academic Vagabonds Provoking à Pied” 
Patricia Palulis, University of Ottawa  
‘“Lately I’ve taken to walking…’ Embodying the Space of the Campus” 
E. Lisa Panayotidis, University of Calgary 
“Spousal Hire” 
Celeste Snowber, Simon Fraser University 
“Never Quite Getting There: Confessions of an Academic Wanna-Be” 
Joanna Szabo, Mount Royal University 
 
I never read them all but I thought it is the subject, (dare I say “discipline”?) 
of education that is so unruly and undisciplined that still has room to ex- 
periment and to think outside the ever-increasingly regulated space (or 
regimes) of academic writing. 
I have postponed long enough. This is what I call the pedagogy of dif- 
ferral, the educational science of delay. I did say I would return to this paper 
that refuses to be written. This paper I called “Academic Pathologies”. Here 
is the history of my failed attempts to deal to or realize this concept: 
First, a simply attempt that came with trying to frame an abstract: 
 
In this paper I coin and explore the term ‘academic pathologies’ 
as a form of analysis for understanding disorders of the academic 
self. The paper first provides a genealogy of the various depth 
hermeneutical models employed by Freud focusing on the think- 
ers in the critical theory tradition and it evaluates the attempts 
of Marcuse (One Dimensional Man), Adorno (The Authoritarian 
Personality) and Wilhelm Reich (The Mass Psychology of Fas- 
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cism) to provide a critical psychoanalysis that serves to interpret 
the structure of the personality in relation to the structure of 
society, a relation first contemplated by Freud in Civilization 
and Its Discontents. I indicate how in the critical tradition such 
as Christopher Lasch (The Culture of Narcissism; The Minimal 
Self) and Michel Foucault (Madness and Civilization; The Birth 
of the Clinic; History of Sexuality) provide some interesting pos- 
sibilities for developing an alternative to mainstream educational 
psychology in understanding academic behavior. 
 
In this attempt I never got beyond the abstract but it did indicate the ter- 
ritory I wanted to traverse. Here a second more sustained effort (this time 
in bold to distinguish it is a past attempt): 
 
There is a more or less direct line from the origins of modern 
philosophy – from Descartes’ ‘subjective turn’ and Hegel’s 
Phenomenology – to what we might call today ‘critical polit- 
ical psychology’ or to critical forms of ‘depth psychology’ or 
a ‘critical hermeneutics of the self’ that calls special attention 
to the issue of power in the institutional creation and self-
constitution of identities. Descartes’ assumption of the cogito, 
the reflective ‘I’, as the basis of all claims to knowledge and 
morality set modern philosophy on the track of subjectivity. 
Twentieth century French philosophy’s rehabilitation of Hegel 
coalesced with Descartes’ subjective turn in Henri Bergson’s 
emphasis on the temporality of the subject. Later Alexandre 
Kojéve’s lectures at the Collège de France during the 1930s 
served to introduce an influential generation of thinkers to 
Hegel and began a renaissance in French thought that has 
had lasting impact.  
In the German context critical theory owes its origins also 
to Hegel’s Phenomenology and also to the young humanist 
Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts, to Freud, and later to Hus- 
serl, Heidegger and phenomenological tradition. Indeed, both 
strands of critical philosophy of the subject, both French and 
German were never divorced from questions of power even 
though this was thought different at different periods. Twen- 
tieth century French philosophy beginning with Bergson and 
undergoing transformation at the hands of phenomenology-
existentialism, hermeneutics, structuralism and poststruc- 
turalism, focused heavily upon power as ideology, domination 
and hegemony in the Marxist sense but also attempted to 
foster understandings of disciplinary power, power exercised 
through discourse and forms of continuous control especially 
through the works of Foucault and Deleuze.  
Critical theory as it was inaugurated by Grunsburg, and 
established by Horkheimer and Adorno, working directly 
from sources in Marx and Freud, and later phenomenology 
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as it was developed by Heidegger, flourished with various 
combinations of Freudian-Marxism, and Heideggerian-Marx- 
ism in the works of Eric Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and 
Wilhelm Reich. 
Both the French and German lines were also strongly 
influenced by the avant-garde in art and literature. First, 
Dadism, then Cubism followed by Surrealism under Andre 
Breton, exercised a healthy skepticism of the visual based 
on perpectivist epistemologies and tried to break through 
bourgeois morality by means of a depth psychology of images. 
Breton, working from a marriage of Freud and Marx, tried 
to break with the ‘realism’ and popular hold that bourgoise 
morality had on the imagination and on the taken for granted 
world of ‘the individual.’ The lasting influence of this mixture 
of Freud and Marx in surrealism had a continued influence 
on the French novel. Nadja, Breton’s second novel, published 
in 1928 begins with the question ‘Who am I?’. Through 
automatic writing and altered states the surrealists tried to 
reveal the workings of the unconscious self. They revolution- 
ized French literature and influenced a generation of writers 
and poets: Jean Cocteau, Jacques Prevert, Pierre Reverdy, 
Antonin Artaud, Henri Michaux and Rene Char.  
The Frankfurt School from its beginning was heavily 
influenced by the German tradition of the Bildungsroman 
and its early secular humanism evidenced in thwe works of 
Eric Fromm as well as Adorno and Horkheimer recorded 
its intellectual indebtedness to the concepts of Bildung itself 
as it influenced German philosophy and life more broadly, 
fostering a set of kindred concepts for thinking – autonomy, 
authenticity, duty, responsibility and obligation – even if 
these were open to questions and themselves the object of 
suspicion ‘after Auschwitz’.  
What became ‘postcolonial studies’ in the 1970s had its 
origins in two areas: the phenomenology of Hegel, once 
again, that in the tradition of Memmoni, Lacan and Sartre 
transformed itself into the phenomenology of racism, of the 
racialized self under the influence of Frantz Fanon who wrote 
works like Wretched of the Earth, Black Skin, White Masks 
and developed and inspired a psychopathy of colonization. 
 
This felt I was on the right track. Intuitively I felt my instincts were close to 
the heart of the matter but I again faltered. The scope was too large even if 
it pinpointed the phenomenological beginnings. It spanned across the whole 
of nineteenth century German philosophy and twentieth century French and 
German philosophy to focus on the different accounts of power put forward 
by the Frankfurt school philosophers and the contemporary French thinkers 
like Foucault. 
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Here was a note I made to myself once on the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and its text revision in 2000, known as 
the DSM-IV-TR. I was anxious to try to lend some contemporary and 
reputable guide as a basis for my thesis. The DSM-IV organizes each psy- 
chiatric diagnosis into five levels (axes) relating to different aspects of 
disorder or disability: 
• Axis I: Clinical disorders, including major mental disorders, and learning 
disorders 
• Axis II: Personality disorders and mental retardation (although devel- 
opmental disorders, such as Autism, were coded on Axis II in the previous 
edition, these disorders are now included on Axis I) 
• Axis III: Acute medical conditions and physical disorders 
• Axis IV: Psychosocial and environmental factors contributing to the dis- 
order 
• Axis V: Global Assessment of Functioning or Children’s Global Assess- 
ment Scale for children and teens under the age of 18 
 
I noted to myself and excerpted the following section that focuses on early 
childhood, identifying especially with “Reading Disorder, Mathematics 
Disorder, Disorder of “Written Expression, and Learning Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified” and wondering how nobody had ever diagnosed 
my learning disorders: 
The provision of a separate section for disorders that are usually first 
diagnosed in Usually First Diagnosed in Infancy, Childhood, or Adoles- 
cence Learning Disorders. These disorders are characterized by academic 
functioning that is substantially below that expected given the person’s 
chronological age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education. 
The specific disorders included in this section are Reading Disorder, 
Mathematics Disorder, Disorder of Written Expression, and Learning 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
Motor Skills Disorder. This includes Developmental Coordination 
Disorder, which is characterized by motor coordination that is substantially 
below that expected given the person’s chronological age and measured 
intelligence. 
Communication Disorders. These disorders are characterized by dif- 
ficulties in speech or language and include Expressive Language Disorder, 
Mixed Receptive-Expressive Language Disorder, Phonological Disorder, 
Stuttering, and Communication Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders. These disorders are characterized 
by severe deficits and pervasive impairment in multiple areas of develop- 
ment. These include impairment in reciprocal social interaction, impairment 
in communication, and the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, and 
activities. The specific disorders included in this section are Autistic Dis- 
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order, Rett’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, Asperger’s 
Disorder, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Spec- 
ified. Attention-Deficit and Disruptive Behavior Disorders. This section 
includes Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, which is characterized 
by prominent symptoms of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity. 
Subtypes are provided for specifying the predominant symptom presentation: 
Predominantly Inattentive Type, Predominantly Hyperactive-Impulsive 
Type, and Combined Type. Also included in this section are the Dis- 
ruptive Behavior Disorders: Conduct Disorder is characterized by a pattern 
of behavior that violates the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate 
societal norms or rules; Oppositional Defiant Disorder is characterized by 
a pattern of negativistic, hostile, and defiant behavior. This section also in- 
cludes two Not Otherwise Specified categories: Attention-Deficit/Hyper- 
activity Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and Disruptive Behavior 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (pp. 37–8). 
Actually I was/am dyslexic and also suffer from ADHD. My attention 
span is very short. Anybody who knows me can identify that I suffer from 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder. These I take to be my philosophical dis- 
positions and tools. I never grew out of the developmental disorders.  
In another take I started the paper with a couple of quotations from 
Wittgenstein: 
 
What is your aim in philosophy?  
–To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle (PI 309) 
--Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden;  
he says again and again “I know that that’s a tree”,  
pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives  
and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane.  
We are only doing philosophy.” 
--Wittgenstein, On Certainty § 467 
 
And then continued (text in italics): 
 
Introduction 
Wittgenstein was strongly influenced by Sigmund Freud, Karl Krauss, and 
William James. He famously develops a therapeutic view of philosophy as 
one that sees philosophy as a parasitic and infectious discourse feeding on 
the use of words in ordinary language and failing to get a clear view of the 
way we talk about the world. Philosophy is not only destructive (or des- 
constructive) in the sense of dismantling pseudo problems, it has thera- 
peutic effects and philosophy can act as a kind of purgative enabling us to 
stop doing philosophy thus freeing us from philosophical pathologies. 
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Linguistic therapy can defuse and neutralize miscreant theories and it can 
also free us from the dominant or ruling metaphors that hold us captive. 
Wittgenstein alerts us to the way in which very general pictures of how we 
view the relation between language and reality easily become part of our 
philosophical illusion and a fit subject for pathology of the intellect. In an 
obvious sense these broad philosophical assumptions that govern the dis- 
courses of the human sciences, of the humanities and social sciences, con- 
stitute a clear picture of academic pathologies based on the kind of confusion 
that takes place when language goes on holiday. In this context as Witt- 
genstein demonstrates often philosophical understanding is a matter of will 
rather than intellect. 
Wittgenstein once said he regarded himself as a disciple of Freud. 
Indeed, Jacques Bouveresse in Wittgenstein Reads Freud, argues that ‘Witt- 
genstein is the “disciple” of Freud who seems to do nothing but raise 
objections to his master’ (p. 41). And while Wittgenstein attacked the scien- 
tific status of psychoanalysis he did also believe that Freud had invented a 
line of thinking. Wittgenstein’s view of Freud was tempered by his own 
reappraisal of positivism and his view on the purity of language came from 
the Viennese satirist and critic Krauss who in the journal Die Fackel wrote 
’Psychoanalysis is that spiritual disease of which it considers itself to be 
the cure.’ Krauss believed reason to be instrumental and values to arise out 
of creative imagination and Wittgenstein came under his spell in seeking to 
clarify and purify language, linking language to ethics as a critique of 
culture. Russell Goodman (2002) has argued that Wittgenstein learned a 
great deal from William James’ The Principles of Psychology which he first 
read in 1912 and The Varieties of Religious Experience and shared a set of 
commitments: “to anti-foundationalism, to the description of concrete details 
of human life, to the priority of practice over intellect, and to the impor- 
tance of religion in understanding human life” (p. 5). 
The term “pathology of philosophy” also has been applied by Donald 
W. Livingston (1998) in relation to Hume’s Philosophical Melancholy and 
Delirium, a book that seeks to explore Hume’s answers to the questions’ 
what is philosophy?’ and ‘what is the philosophical life?’ on the basis of 
virtues of the true philosopher who understands that philosophy springs from 
the mystical polytheistic religion that provides us with the first understand- 
ing of themselves and the world. Hume seeks the origins of philosophical 
practices in the dispositions of human nature and sees the culture of Europe 
as progressively shaped by secular modes of thought (p. xiv). 
 
This was followed by a version of Hegels’ influence on critical theory and I 
ended with the note to myself: 
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Continue by reference to Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality ending with 
a tentative typology of disorders of (the academic) self. 
 
Horkheimer’s Preface: 
 
The central theme of the work is a relatively new concept – the rise of an 
‘anthropological’ species we call the authoritarian type of man. In contrast to 
the bigot of the older style he seems to combine the ideas and skills which are 
typical of a highly industrialized society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs. 
He is at the same time enlightened and superstitious, proud to be an individualist 
and in constant fear of not being like all the others, jealous of his independence 
and inclined to submit blindly to power and authority. The character structure 
which comprises these conflicting trends has already attracted the attention of 
modern philosophers and political thinkers. This book approaches the problem 
with the means of sociopsychological research. 
 
This, as you can witness, was a more sustained attempt. I was trying to 
develop a philosophical concept of “academic pathologies” that owed some- 
thing to a line of critical though with its basis in Hegel and phenomenology 
and flowered into a critical psychoanalysis. It made a central place for 
Wittgenstein. 
Adorno’s “authoritarian personality” referred to a cluster of traits reflect- 
ing a desire for order, a kind of rigidity, unquestioning obedience, respect 
for authority, a desire for highly structured command, scapegoating and a 
highly conventional outlook. The authoritarian personality theory was 
devised to explain racism and the F-scale that Adorno et al. designed is no 
longer used partly because group loyalty is seen as a commonplace and 
ethnocentrism and stereotyping are also seen as common and ineradicable 
psychological processes.  
In another version I entitled the essay: “Academic Pathologies: Power, 
Identity and the Political Psychology of Institutions”. Clearly, I was trying 
to focus on institutional power relations as a crucial factor in the devel- 
opment of academic pathologies. In part I was motivated by my own very 
personal observations in different university institutions around the world 
of the simple truism concerning the effects of administrative power on 
individuals: how suddenly the power and status of an administrative position 
would transform the personality of an individual and how it led often to the 
effects of the exercise of administrative reason and academic life, deform- 
ing it, regulating it, counting it. I wanted to theorize this condition or at 
least I wanted to ensure that any theory of academic pathology could take 
account of this common observation. I tried to understand the larger institu- 
tional forces at work in terms of academic reason, sometimes cross-cut and 
disruption by administrative reason and increasingly by commercial or en- 
trepreneurial reason. 
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Then I started, perhaps, more conventionally under the same title with a 
return to early Western origins (text in bold): 
 
On Temple of Apollo at the Theatre of Delphi in the valley of Docis in 
Greece-- the site of the Delphi Oracle, perhaps the most famous in 
classical Greece--three inscriptions were carved into the lintel of the 
Temple:  
γνωθι σεαυτόν (gnothi seauton = “know thyself”)  
μηδέν άγαν (meden agan = “nothing in excess”) 
Εγγύα πάρα δ’ατη (eggua para d’atē = “make a pledge and 
mischief is nigh”) 
 
These maxims are attributed to the Seven Sages. The inscriptions 
reputedly have their origins in prehistoric times and in the worship of 
the Goddess Gaia. There is some archeological evidence to suggest 
occupation of the site around the 8th century BC. Apollo spoke through 
the Oracle, generally virtuous older women known as the Pythia. The 
Oracle was consulted on all major occasions and made prophecies. Dr 
E. Partida, the archaeologist at the Hellenistic Ministry Culture’s web- 
site at the archeological ruins suggests: 
 
Between the sixth and fourth centuries BC, the Delphic 
oracle, which was regarded as the most trustworthy, was at 
its peak. It was delivered by the Pythia, the priestess, and 
interpreted by the priests of Apollo. Cities, rulers and ordinary 
individuals alike consulted the oracle, expressing their grati- 
tude with great gifts and spreading its fame around the 
world. The oracle was thought to have existed since the dawn 
of time… 
The rise of the Rationalist movement in philosophy in the 
third century BC, damaged the oracle’s authority, yet its 
rituals continued unchanged into the second century AD, when 
it was consulted by Hadrian and visited by Pausanias.  
 
‘Know thyself’ is the founding expression of the relation between the 
subject and truth as Foucault notes in The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
and ‘know thyself’ has a fundamental relationship to ‘care of oneself’ 
(epimeleia heatou). 
Foucault suggests that the inscription ‘know thyself’ ‘did not pre- 
scribe self-knowledge, neither as a basis of morality, nor as part of a 
relationship with the gods’ (p. 3). The inscription only gathers the sig- 
nificance concerning self-knowledge much later. At the time it meant 
something like ‘don’t ask too many questions’ or ‘as a mortal don’t 
presume too much of the gods’. 
Only when it appears in philosophical discourse (such as the Apology) 
with Socrates does it take on added significance, especially when coupled 
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with ‘take care of yourself’. Indeed, Foucault maintains that the latter 
– ‘take care of yourself’ – is the ground or foundation for the former –
‘know thyself’. Thus, ‘take care of yourself’ was, according to Foucault, 
‘a fundamental principle for describing the philosophical attitude in 
Greek, Hellenistic and Roman culture’ (p. 8). Epicurus uses the Greek 
word ‘therapeuein’ meaning both medical care (therapy for the soul) 
as well as service to a master. This attitude became the principle of 
moral rationality in Greek culture and even permeated Christianity, 
appearing especially in Christian asceticism. 
Within the Western philosophical tradition the self has been posited 
as an objective, unified and universal entity – both ahistorical and 
acultural – that transcends particular historical and cultural contexts. 
The concept has grown out of religious and theological discussions where 
the enduring part of the essential, “true” or authentic self focussed 
upon the soul, spirit or mind – an immaterial aspect – that survived the 
body. In modern Western societies, beginning with Descartes, Hobbes, 
Locke and Kant, the sovereign self has been assumed to be a separate, 
individual, autonomous and rational being existing independently and 
logically prior to society. Indeed, this tradition of the rational, auton- 
omous subject has taken two influential forms: the Kantian ethical 
subject and the self-interested individual of liberal political economy 
established by Adam Smith and David Ricardo – so-called homo eco- 
nomicus, based on assumptions of individuality, rationality and self-
interest. Both lines of development have been responsible for founding 
and structuring the central institutions of liberal culture synonymous with 
modernity. Not only is this concept radically individualist, rationalist 
and possessive but it is also assumed to be given and unchanging – an 
essential self that is not historically or culturally constituted.   
While socially and politically progressive in its day – when these 
related conceptions first received their formulation – a number of tell- 
ing critiques have been mounted against the self as sovereign individual. 
These critiques have come from all quarters. Radical feminist philos- 
ophers, from Simone de Beauvoir on, have argued that the dominant 
Western concept of self is both patriarchal and masculinist and they 
have substituted most often a relational notion of self, based on the 
ethic of care. Marxist and socialist critics have drawn attention to the 
ideological nature of the subject underlying liberal political economy 
insisting that the self is a set social relations defined largely by under- 
lying economic forces. Scholars from psychoanalysis have criticised the 
assumptions of rationality and individuality positing relational modes 
of analysis that recognise more fully the role of emotions and desire. 
Communitarians have criticised the liberal individual as the atomic 
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political sub-stratum beyond which one cannot go to invoke a commu- 
nitarian view of the polity. Critics from other cultures have questioned 
the ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism of Western notions of self and the 
way it has been advanced as the basis of a universalist global society. 
Some of these strands of critique share with postmodernist and post- 
structuralist accounts the radical working assumption that the Western 
concept of self is an historical and cultural construction – an historical 
ontology – that is inextricably bound up with questions of power. On 
this view Western concepts of the self have shifted over time. 
 
The rest of this attempted and failed essay goes on to explore themes 
similar to those recounted above and finishes with the following notes for 
different sections on Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard I took this passage from 
Jens Glebe-Moeller’s (1997) “Notes on Wittgenstein’s Reading of Kierke- 
gaard:”  
 
Wittgenstein told his friend Maurice Drury that Kierkegaard 
was the most profound author of the nineteenth century and a 
saint. Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein regard philosophy as 
an ethical pursuit in which analysis and conceptual clarification 
are to be employed not in the service of speculative thought, but 
to identify self-deception and dispel illusion in order to make it 
possible to live an authentic life. 
 
At this point and in reflection of where I have been I realize that there are 
at least two lines of argument I would like to add to this mélange. First, a 
new insertion from Judith Butler’s (1997) Excitable Speech that introduces 
the gender dimension into the speaking, writing, thinking subject – a not so 
obvious a category before Simone de Beauvoir’s (1948) The Second Sex. 
Butler drawing on this philosophical tradition demonstrates that gender is a 
performative category rather than a fixed or stable identity and in this work 
she explores the phenomenon of “hate speech” in the US. “Excitable speech” 
is a metaphor for the complex interrelations between language, identity and 
agency. Butler maintains we are all linguistic beings and become ourselves 
through the continual and forever risky negotiation with the very linguistic 
system that permits our semiotic identity to emerge. For Butler linguistic 
being proceeds from the intersubjective nature of language that is both 
enabling and disabling, with great power to wound but also makes possible 
the speaking and writing time of the subject. If the notion of “anxieties of 
knowledge” applies at all most certainly it applies with regard to the dis- 
cursive (self)positioning of women that up until very recently have often 
been reduced to silence. 
Second, and in relation to educational and philosophical themes that run 
so deep in Aotearoa (New Zealand), what I am going to call the “imperial 
writing subject”. I cannot do justice to the complexity of this topic here but 
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let me say briefly: Maori children who are fluent speakers of the Maori 
language who grew up of marae in isolated rural areas like Pungaru were 
forced at school to “write” te reo Maori rather than “speak” it in NZ School 
Certificate Examinations prior to 1988. Successive generations of Maori 
children fluent in te reo Maori were failed at the subject “Maori” because it 
was an examination that examined only written Maori (i.e., the anglicized, 
alphabetized English literate form) and for many this was equivalent to fail- 
ing at their own culture. The pathological consequences have been enor- 
mously damaging for Maori students. 
 
In Lieu of a Conclusion 
 
This paper and the presentation based on it has been a history of my failed 
attempts to manufacture a usable concept of “academic pathology” that does 
not simply rest of disorders of the individual academic self, or to problems 
surrounding the anxiety of knowing or the fear of writing. I have tried to 
address the collective and institutional dimensions of the anxieties of know- 
ing that address institutional power relations. Throughout the essay and 
during its writing it became clearer to me that the positionality of the 
subject was important but also and increasingly one might say the cultural 
specificity of the subject became a central aspect in my thinking for how 
fear is experienced, how anxiety manifests itself, and how power relations 
perceived are all matters that can only be described under the category of 
difference. For instances, how does the fear of writing manifest itself in 
traditionally oral cultures? How are women textually represented and how 
do they represent themselves? What of the writing and speaking subject in 
the process of becoming an academic self, especially for women, for Maori, 
for cultural minorities, for immigrants, for those for whom thinking and 
writing in ideographs is the cultural norm?  
To deal adequately with these anxiety disorders – anxieties of knowing 
– we need to locate them firmly within the wider psychological ecology of 
the culture of the self and to encourage a ongoing set of reflections on the 
question of academic self-knowledge. In this way we may come to under- 
stand more deeply that knowing has its own pathologies.  
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